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Abstract 
In this paper we appraise current agricultural subsidy policy in the EU. Several sources of 
its inefficiency are identified: it is inefficient for supporting farmers’ incomes or guaranteeing 
food security, and irrational transfer payments decoupled from actual performance that may 
be negative for environmental protection, social cohesion, etc. Based on a simplified 
economic model, we prove that there is “reverse redistribution” in the current tax-subsidy 
system, which cannot be avoided. To find a possible way to distribute subsidies more 
efficiently and equitably, several alternative subsidy systems (the pure loan, the harvest tax 
and the income contingent loan) are presented and examined. 
 
Introduction 
    Payments to farmers are a central part of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
which dictates agricultural policy in all 27 member states. It accounts for almost half of the 
EU’s budget and almost half of the legislation [1]. Initially the objectives of CAP were to 
(Rome Treaty in 1955): (1) increase agricultural productivity; (2) ensure a fair standard of 
living for those engaged in agriculture; (3) stabilize agricultural markets; (4) assure the 
availability of food; and (5) ensure reasonable prices for consumers.  
In recent years, the role of CAP has been further broadened to (Article 4 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005): (1) provide high-quality food and non-food products; (2) 
protect the environment; and (3) promote the harmonious development of different regions. 
The objectives of CAP can be understood from the perspectives of Economy, Environment 
and Society (EES), as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The most important instrument of CAP is the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) which is not 
related to the volume of commodity output; so called decoupled payments. To qualify for 
subsidies (i.e. payments in the language of the European Commision), farmers are required to 
keep their land in “Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition” (GAEC) and respect 
relevant statutory management requirements, together referred to as cross-compliance.  
The SPS alone accounts for almost 75% of the CAP budget (€54 billion annually) or 32% 
of the total EU budget [2]. Member States (MS) were given some freedom to choose how to 
implement the SPS in 2005. They could choose a regionalized payment with farmers 
receiving an identical payment per hectare within a region (regional model), a farm-specific 
payment which is based on each farms’ historical production level (historical model) or a 
combination of both (hybrid model).   
The main advantages of SPS are that farmers’ output decisions are now guided by 
consumer demand and not distorted by output subsidies, and its benefits for the environment. 
However, due to the heterogeneity of agricultural and socio-economic conditions in the EU, 
SPS may also have some disadvantages as follows: 
1. The SPS has limited potential for supporting farmers’ incomes which is the 
original motivation of the support [3]. Current support is highly concentrated to a 
few large farms, whereas many small farms that are more dependent on support 
receive only a relatively small share of the total payment. 
2. The SPS’s contribution to food security is not as large as imagined because the 
bulk of the payments are paid to the most fertile regions where market prices are 
sufficient to guarantee food production [1].  
 
 
3. SPS has the tendency to be distributed to richer regions and farmers, which may be 
harmful to social cohesion [4].  
4. In practice, there is inadequate feedback between levels of public goods provided 
by agriculture and payments received by individual farms. Farmers are usually 
remunerated for carrying out particular management tasks rather than being 
rewarded directly for measured environmental performance, and payment levels 
are not related to actual costs. 
Future EU agricultural policy should aim to enhance the overall competitiveness of 
agriculture, protect the environment and promote rural development. However, in general SPS 
has weak rationale in terms of environmental externalities and social cohesion. So the 
question as to how to distribute payments reasonably, i.e. to maximize social welfare in terms 
of the stated goals, is an important issue to study.  
The underlying motivation for the current distribution of SPS payments is compensation 
for historical reductions in agricultural price support (first in 1992 as a result of the 
MacSharry Reform). One possible justification for SPS could be capital market imperfections 
which prevent farmers from borrowing for financing investment [5]. Another justification is 
environmental externalities which cannot be reflected in the market prices [6].  
In regard to income redistribution, the current system also has some severe drawbacks. 
First, farmers with the highest yielding land and hence who are competitive in the market, 
receive the highest payments per ha.  Accordingly, farmers with less fertile land receive lower 
payments per ha, and hence their farms face marginalization and abandonment, which could 
have irreversible and detrimental impact on European agricultural production and its cultural 
landscapes [7]. Secondly, since payments are based on area, the largest farms receive the 
 
 
largest total payments. Consequently, the current CAP and its SPS may imply reverse 
redistribution, i.e. redistribution from the poor to the rich [8].  
In summary, SPS should be better targeted to poorer farmers (small farms) and the 
environment. In principle, high-income households should receive a low subsidy (if at all) and 
low-income households a high subsidy [9]. As public goods, environmental products should 
be subsidized by CAP to cover relevant costs. 
However, reality may be more complex. On the one hand, more direct payments to 
marginal regions and poorer farmers will affect investment and not be conducive to 
economies of scale [10]. On the other hand, the current subsidy system is hurting small farms 
and poor farmers through reverse distribution, which will be harmful for cohesion and 
environmental protection [11]. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between equity and efficiency.  
While the 2003 reform may be the most radical reform of the CAP to date, the concept of 
SPS or decoupled agricultural support is not new. Decoupling was first proposed more than 
50 years ago. Beard and Swinbank provided a comprehensive review of the early proposals to 
decouple agricultural support in the US in the 1950s and in Europe in the 1960s [12]. Josling 
further argued that a direct income payment unrelated to output should be a way of ensuring 
reasonable standards of living for rural people [13].  
However, decoupled payments as a form of government intervention have been roundly 
criticized from different perspectives since its inception. Criticism has been wide-ranging, and 
even the European Commission has long been persuaded of the numerous defects of 
decoupled payment. The main opposing viewpoints include: 
(1) Production distortion 
 
 
While the payment under SPS may be decoupled from production, it is still a source of 
income for the farm households and may indirectly affect production decisions through the 
“wealth effect”. Hennessy studied the relationships between decoupled payments, farmers’ 
risk preferences and production decisions [14]. He found that if farmers’ risk aversions 
declined as incomes increased, an increase in wealth as a consequence of the decoupled 
payment could induce them to take riskier production decisions, and thus increase outputs 
compared to the situation in which no decoupled payment was made.  
Decoupled payments also relax the individuals’ capital constraints thus lowering the cost 
of capital [15]. Revell and Oglethorpe also suggested the possibility that decoupled payments 
could affect production through an expectations effect [16]. They claimed that producers 
might adopt a ‘safety first’ strategy and make only minimal changes to production plans in 
case future payments were reassessed and again related to production or agricultural activity. 
Therefore, one of the decoupling’ objectives, not to distort production, is not fully fulfilled in 
the current policy framework. 
(2) Environmental problems 
The cross-compliance effect is the other objective of decoupled payments. However, some 
empirical results show that this effect is also complicated. Based on two micro-economic 
models (AgriPolis and MODAM), Uthe et al. found that in the case of grassland, decoupling 
led to improvement of the environment as a result of the cross-compliance obligations [17]. 
However, with respect to arable land, decoupling led to negative environmental effects due to 
changes in the crop mix, with less cereals and a greater area of more intensive winter rape and 
row crops being grown. 
 (3) Hurting small farms 
 
 
Although most policy makers in Europe agree that they want to promote "family farms" 
and small scale production, decoupled payments in fact benefit large farms much more than 
small farms, because decoupled payments are linked to farm size. So while subsidies allow 
small farms to persist, large farms tend to receive the greatest share of the subsidies. Within 
the 2008 Health Check of the CAP [18], a first step was taken to limit decoupled payments to 
very large landowners. 
There are also some other criticisms such as the equity among member states [19], the 
unfair competition with developing countries [20] and so on. Among them, the tradeoff 
between efficiency and equity is the source of many controversies.  
Motivated by the experiences of EU and the United States, we attempt to construct a 
simplified economic model and answer the following questions: 
(1) How can we define efficiency and equity in regard to agricultural policy? What are the 
underlying conflicts between equity and efficiency in the current SPS?  
(2) Is there an integrated subsidy system that can achieve a balance between efficiency and 
equity?  
The results may shed light on the wisdom of the current CAP and the proposed 2013 
reform. Also, some conclusions regarding general rules for designing agricultural subsidy 
systems are provided. The article is structured as follows: firstly, a theoretical analysis of 
efficiency and equity in the current SPS is presented; secondly, we compare the efficiency and 
equity of three novel options for agricultural subsidies; finally, conclusions and policy 
recommendations according to the current direction of CAP reform are given. 
 
 
Analysis 
1. Models     
    The model presented in this paper is inspired by the work of García-Peñalosa and Wälde 
[8]. In this section, a small open economy and relevant assumptions are initially described. 
Next, the perfect market and its operating mechanism are presented for reference. The main 
variables and functions are listed in Appendix S1. 
1.1 Description of the economy 
A small open economy with a population of constant size N is considered here. All 
individuals live for two periods and are identical in all respects except for their initial wealth 
which is denoted by n. Its frequency distribution is given by f (n). At the beginning of the first 
period, people choose whether to work in the agricultural sector or in other sectors. If people 
choose to work in other sectors, they will receive an income in both periods. Otherwise they 
enroll in the agricultural sector. In this case, they do some farming in the first period and 
harvest (realize their income) in the next. If they choose to work in the agricultural sector, 
they also need to decide whether to produce only agricultural products or to produce both 
agricultural and environmental products (e.g. landscape). In this paper, farmers are assumed 
to produce both agricultural and environmental products because the latter is currently 
profitable.  
Farmers are categorized based on the size of their farms. It is assumed that there are two 
sizes of farms based on the area of agricultural land: small farms (s) and large farms (l). The 
exogenous rental prices for these are rs and rl respectively, where rs < rl. Economies of scale 
and heterogeneous soil fertility are not considered in this paper. 
 
 
Consequently the total labor force can be divided into three categories: (1) Individuals who 
are employed in other sectors (o); (2) Farmers who produce both crops and environmental 
products on small farms (s); and (3) Farmers who produce both crops and environmental 
products on large farms (l). The three types of labor (o, s and l) are illustrated in Figure 2. 
Given that iL  (i=o, s or l) is the size of the labor force of each type i, then o s lL L L N   .  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The costs of the different types of labor are given in Table 1. For individuals in other 
sectors, they don’t need to invest any money for their employment. For individuals in the 
agricultural sector, they need to pay the rent for the farm’s land (rs or rl) and also the costs of 
generating environmental products in period one (i.e. prior to receiving any income).   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
It is assumed that borrowing in order to finance costs for individuals in the agricultural 
sector is not possible in reality as agriculture is high risk and not satisfactory collateral for 
private lenders. Hence, in the absence of government intervention, an individual can only 
enroll in the agricultural sector if his (her) initial wealth (n) is large enough to cover his (her) 
costs.  
The economy produces three types of products: agricultural products (A), environmental 
products (E) and other products (O). Since we desire to study individuals’ career choices, we 
omit other production factors and only focus on the amount of labor. Define I(), AL(), AH() 
and G() as the production functions for other products, agricultural products from small and 
large farms, and environmental products respectively as shown in equations (1)-(3). 
                                  oO = I L                                                                   (1) 
 
 
                          s lA= AL L  + AH L                                                         (2) 
  ,s lE = G L L                                                                (3) 
The purpose of introducing production functions is to determine returns to labor in the 
different sectors. In a perfect market, returns should be equalized across all sectors. Otherwise, 
individuals in the low income sectors will move to the high income sectors. In this paper, 
other endowment differences between individuals, such as abilities, are not considered. 
Consequently, for a given total population, there is an optimal labor structure for which there 
is a maximum total income for the entire population.  
More specifically, as a production factor, the marginal output of labor should be positive 
but show a decreasing trend when the amount of labor is increasing. Therefore, first 
derivatives of production functions are positive while second derivatives are negative. In a 
small open economy, OP , AP  and EP  are prices for other products, agricultural products and 
environmental products respectively which are determined exogenously. The return (Py) of 
each labor force is the product of its marginal output and corresponding price, as shown in 
equations (4)-(7): 
0
( )o L o OPy I L P                                                     (4) 
( ) ( , )
s ss L s A L s l E
Py AL L P G L L P                                         (5) 
 ( ) ( , )
l ll L l A L s l E
Py AH L P G L L P                                           (6) 
o s lL L L N                                                              (7) 
where equation (7) is the population constraint. 
 
 
The role of the government is to buy environmental products, subsidize farmers if 
necessary and levy taxes to maintain a balanced budget. We will examine the characteristics 
of several possible subsidy systems below. 
1.2 The benchmark case of perfect capital markets 
We assume a situation where capital markets are perfect as our benchmark. All people can 
borrow and there is no need for government intervention. Neither taxes and subsidies, nor 
uncertainty and risk aversion are considered in this section. The only role of government in 
the perfect capital market is to set the price of environmental products and buy them. The 
lifetime income (W) of an individual who is employed in other sectors is the present value of 
payments from other products for two periods, as shown in equation (8). 
(1 ) ( )
oo L o O
W R I L P                                                    (8) 
where R is the exogenous discount rate. 
The lifetime income of an individual in the agricultural sector is equal to the sum of the 
discounted revenues from agricultural and environmental products minus the land rent (r) and 
the cost of producing environmental products (EC) which are payable in the first period, as 
shown in equations (9)-(10). 
[ ( ) ( , ) ]
s ss s L s A L s l E
W r EC R AL L P G L L P                                (9)  
[ ( ) ( , ) ]
l ll l L l A L s l E
W r EC R AH L P G L L P                              (10) 
The cost for producing environmental products, EC, is fixed and identical for both farm 
types.  
Since there are not any barriers for employment, individuals with lower incomes can move 
to the high-income sector, which would reduce the high-income sector’s returns to labor and 
 
 
boost those in the low-income sector. Consequently, in an equilibrium economy, all 
individuals’ incomes will be equalized ( *oW =
*
sW =
*
lW ). Equations (8)-(10) are simultaneously 
solved to obtain the optimal structure of labor * * * *( , , )o s lL L L L , which is shown in equation 
(11). 
*
* * *
* * *
(1 ) ( )
[ ( ) ( , ) ]
[ ( ) ( , ) ]
o
s s
l l
L o O
s L s A L s l E
l L l A L s l E
R I L P
r EC R AL L P G L L P
r EC R AH L P G L L P
  
       
       
                         (11) 
The optimal labor structure depends on the factor prices (rs, rl and EC) and the product 
prices ( oP , AP and EP ). The labor structure 
*L  is also called the efficient level of labor and will 
be our point of reference (as shown in Figure 3). 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
In the next section, the implications of three subsidy systems under imperfect markets are 
analyzed. They are the current SPS system, subsidies to achieve the efficient level of labor in 
each sector (i.e. that maximizes output as shown in Figure 3) and subsidies to achieve the 
equitable level of lifetime income (all individuals have an equal lifetime income). 
2. The working of traditionally used tax-subsidy system 
    In reality, farmers might have difficulty obtaining loans to finance their costs for renting 
land and producing environmental products as shown in Section 1.2. Therefore, a subsidy is 
needed to aid poor farmers while a tax is collected from the entire population to keep a 
balanced budget. The aim of this section is to examine the current SPS and determine the 
optimal labor structure in the context of the chosen subsidy and taxation policy (Section 2.1). 
 
 
Also two specific examples of the SPS (subsidizing the efficient level of labor and the 
equitable level of lifetime income) are discussed. 
2.1 The current SPS system 
We assume that T is a lump-sum tax levied on all individuals in the first period of their 
lives. In the current SPS system, every farmer who produces certain environmental products is 
eligible for the subsidy. Small farms receive subsidy S1, while large farms receive S2. In 
practice, SPS provides subsidies according to the size of the farms. Therefore, in general there 
is a relationship thatS1 S2 .  
The government chooses the subsidy rate and then sets the lump-sum tax so as to maintain 
a balanced budget, as shown in equation (12), which means that the required level of tax is 
equal to total subsidies. 
 T N S1 S2s lL L                                                      (12) 
Individuals in other sectors (o) pay a tax but receive no subsidy. Farmers (s and l) pay the 
same tax but receive different subsidies. This implies a net transfer to farmers because there 
are more individuals paying the tax than receiving the subsidy ( s lN L L  ). 
Define ( , , )in i o s l  as the minimum level of initial wealth in order to be able to cover i’s 
costs. In the absence of borrowing, an individual’s initial wealth must be large enough to 
cover the subsidized costs plus the tax. For example, for farmers with small farms (s), their 
required minimum initial wealth, n s , can be calculated based on equation (12), as shown in 
equation (13). 
 
 
n T r EC S1
1 +S2 r EC S1
1 2 EC
s s
s l
s
s l
s
S L L
N
L N LS S r
N N
   
    
     
                                         (13) 
For farmers with large farms (l), their required minimum initial wealth, n l , can be 
calculated as shown in equation (14). 
n T EC S2
1 +S2 EC S2
2 1 EC
l l
s l
l
l s
l
r
S L L r
N
L N LS S r
N N
   
    
     
                                            (14) 
It is assumed that n l is larger than n s because farmers with large farms need more 
investment (i.e. pay higher land rents). Clearly, the higher the subsidy, the lower the level of 
initial wealth required for being in the agriculture sector. For clarity, it is assumed that the 
labor structure under the current SPS is ( , , )a a a ao s lL L L L . Suppose that under the subsidies of 
S1 and S2, the capital market constraint is still binding for some individuals, so that more 
individuals want to be in the agriculture sector than can afford to be ( asL <
*
sL , 
a
lL <
*
lL ), which 
means that the lifetime income of farmers may exceed the lifetime income of people in other 
sectors. In this case, the number of individuals having small (large) farms is equal to the 
number of individuals whose initial wealth is between n s  and n l  (larger than n l ) as shown in 
equations (15) and (16). 
( )
l s
a
s
n n n
L f n
 
                                                                  (15) 
( )
l
a
l
n n
L f n

                                                                     (16) 
 
 
Equation (15) and (16) can be used with equations (13) and (14) to jointly determine the 
sizes of s and l, and the minimum initial wealth levels required for entering the agricultural 
sector ( sn and ln ),  as a function of the subsidies S1 and S2, and the distribution of initial 
wealth ( )f n . 
2.2 Subsidizing the efficient level of labor 
Suppose that the purpose of the government is to maximize the economic output of a given 
generation; then they should design a subsidy system to achieve the optimal labor 
structure * * * *( , , )o s lL L L L . In this case, there should be exactly *sL  individuals whose initial 
wealth is between T EC S1b bsr   and T EC S2b blr   , and *lL  individuals whose initial 
wealth is larger than T EC S2b blr    where Tb , S1b and S2b are the tax, subsidy for farmers 
with small farms and subsidy for farmers with large farms to achieve the optimal labor 
structure respectively. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Figure 4 examines graphically the effect of the subsidies 1bS and 2bS  on the lifetime 
incomes of the three types of labor. The solid lines represent lifetime incomes in the absence 
of subsidies, where 0 0 0 0( , , )o s lL L L L is the labor structure in this case. 0sL  and 0lL , which are 
numbers of s and l whose initial wealth can afford agricultural costs,  are smaller than *sL and 
*
lL respectively. At
0L , lifetime incomes are higher for s and l but lower for o than under 
perfect markets. Under the tax-subsidy system (subsidizing the efficient level), the lifetime 
incomes of o are the incomes received in two periods minus the tax, i.e. 
(1 ) ( )
o
b b
o L o OW T R I L P      . Hence, the introduction of the tax represents a downward 
 
 
shift of the curve oW . The lifetime incomes of s and l are 
1 [ ( ) ( , ) ]
s s
b b b
s s L s A L s l EW S T r EC R AL L P G L L P          and 
2 [ ( ) ( , ) ]
l l
b b b
l l L l A L s l EW S T r EC R AH L P G L L P         respectively. Because S1b and 
S2b are larger than Tb, the lifetime incomes of s and l increase, which means upward shifts of 
sW and lW .  The subsidies can then be set to 1
bS and 2bS so that the distribution of labor is 
exactly * * * *( , , )o s lL L L L , as with perfect capital markets.  
The efficient subsidies ( 1bS and 2bS ) have two distributional consequences:  
Firstly, all individuals are paying taxes that are distributed only among those farmers with 
higher incomes, implying that there is a transfer of resources from the poor to rich individuals. 
This is what is called “reverse redistribution”.  
Secondly, the introduction of efficient subsidies leads to a situation where those who have 
large farms enjoy larger incomes. The efficient subsidy does not remove inequality. And it 
also fails to provide an equality of chances. The difference in the lifetime incomes of 
individuals with large (small) farms and individuals in other sectors is 2bS  ( 1bS ). Therefore, 
there is reverse redistribution under the SPS scheme, not only from the non-agricultural 
sectors to the agricultural sector, but also from all farmers to farmers with large farms. 
The efficient subsidies not only fail to equalize life-time incomes, but also fail to provide 
ex ante equality of chances. Even though some relatively poor individuals can now afford to 
enter the agricultural sector, the greatest opportunity is still offered to the richest individuals. 
As a result, poorer individuals are still systematically excluded from agriculture. 
 
 
2.3 Subsidizing the equitable level of lifetime income 
In this section, subsidies which can guarantee the equality of lifetime incomes are 
examined. The labor structure in this case is termed the equitable labor structure, 
( , , )c c c co s lL L L L . The equitable subsidies ( 1cS and 2cS ) and their corresponding tax ( cT ) are 
defined by equation (17). 
(1 ) ( )
1 [ ( ) ( , ) ]
2 [ ( ) ( , ) ]
o
s s
l l
c c
L o O
c c c c c
s L s A L s l E
c c c c c
l L l A L s l E
T R I L P
S T r EC R AL L P G L L P
S T r EC R AH L P G L L P
    
        
        
                  (17) 
What then is the equitable labor structure cL ? In the section above, it is known that for the 
efficient labor structure, * * * *( , , )o s lL L L L , the lifetime incomes of s and l are larger than that of 
o. In order to reduce the incomes of the former, the subsidies should be further increased to 
increase the numbers of s and l, thus reducing farmers’ incomes and raising incomes in other 
sectors. Therefore, *co oL L , *cs sL L and *cl lL L are all satisfied. 
The increases in the numbers of s and l imply that their marginal products are lower than 
their marginal costs. Therefore, the equitable labor structure, cL , is not efficient since too 
many people enter the agricultural sector. 
Consequently the SPS, as a form of tax-subsidy system, is characterized by a trade-off 
between efficiency and equity: efficient subsidies imply inequality in lifetime incomes; while 
equitable subsidies induce an excessively large number of farmers and thus reduction in the 
total value of economic output. Despite the equality of lifetime income, there is still not 
equality of opportunity, as those with a very low level of initial wealth will still not be able to 
 
 
afford agricultural costs. The only way around this is to provide a subsidy that covers full 
costs; but this will further increase the efficiency loss. 
3. Some possible solutions—the pure loan, the harvest tax or the 
income contingent loan? 
    As the previous discussion has shown, SPS as a traditional tax-subsidy system that implies 
reverse distribution cannot achieve the targets of efficiency and equity simultaneously. 
Therefore, it raises the question whether there is a better solution for an agricultural subsidy 
system. Firstly, the pure loan system is presented; secondly, to solve the problems caused by 
uncertainty and risk-aversion, the harvest tax and the income contingent loan systems are 
presented. Finally, some possible policy options for EU in the future are given for reference.  
3.1 The pure loan scheme 
A straightforward solution, which removes the constraints imposed by imperfect capital 
markets without generating reverse redistribution, is to abolish all subsidies and introduce a 
government loan system. Agricultural costs would be fully financed, and the capital market 
imperfections would be overcome by loans provided by the government. In our highly 
stylized economy, all individuals would then have identical lifetime incomes, the allocation of 
resources would be efficient, and any individuals would have the opportunity of entering into 
agriculture. 
However, the pure loan scheme neglects an important aspect which we have so far not 
taken into account: the risks related to agricultural production. Agricultural production is a 
risky investment, particularly risk stemming from variations in the weather. Hence, from the 
farmers’ perspective, there is risk associated with farming. A simple form of uncertainty is 
 
 
presented in what follows assuming the possibility of successful agricultural production is set 
exogenously. 
It is supposed that farmers, irrespective of farm size, will harvest in the second period with 
probability p ( (0,1)p ) and fail to harvest with probability1 p . If farmers fail, they will enter 
other sectors and receive a salary in the second period. Individuals are assumed to be risk 
averse and have utility functions denoted by ()U . Assume that the expected returns of farmers 
with large farms are larger than those of farmers with small farms which are in turn larger 
than those of individuals in other sectors, as shown in equation (18). 
( ( ( ) ( , ) ) (1 ) ( ) )
( ( ( ) ( , ) ) (1 ) ( ) )
(1 ) ( )
l l o
s s o
o
l L l A L s l E L o O
s L s A L s l E L o O
L o O
r EC R p AH L P G L L P p I L P
r EC R p AL L P G L L P p I L P
R I L P
            
            
  
       (18) 
Different from the analysis in sections 1 and 2, is that the expected returns of farmers are 
larger than individuals in other sectors due to individuals’ risk aversions, as in reality. If there 
is no difference in lifetime incomes between farmers and individuals in other sectors, people 
would prefer the latter to obtain certain incomes. 
Under a pure loan system, individuals who work in other sectors have total wealth 
of (1 ) ( )
oL o O
n R I L P    ; farmers with small farms who succeed have total wealth 
of ( ( ) ( , ) )
s ss L s A L s l E
n r EC R AL L P G L L P       ; farmers with small farms who fail have 
total wealth of ( )
os L o O
n r EC R I L P     ; farmers with large farms who succeed have total 
wealth of ( ( ) ( , ) )
l ll L l A L s l E
n r EC R AH L P G L L P       ; and farmers with large farms who 
fail have total wealth of ( )
ol L o O
n r EC R I L P     . For simplicity, the marginal outputs of 
production functions are assumed to be constant in the two periods. 
 
 
Function ( ,0)sGe n  is defined as the difference between the expected utility of farmers with 
small farms and that of individuals in other sectors in the case of no subsidy, as shown in 
equation (19) where n is the individual’s initial wealth and 0 stands for no subsidy. 
   
( ,0) ( ( ( ) ( , ) ))
(1 ) ( ( ) ) ( (1 ) ( ) )
s s
o o
s s L s A L s l E
s L o O L o O
Ge n p U n r EC R AL L P G L L P
p U n r EC R I L P U n R I L P
        
                               (19) 
Function ( ,0)lGe n  is defined as the difference between the expected utility of farmers with 
large farms and that of individuals in other sectors in the case of no subsidies, as shown in 
equation (20). 
( ,0) ( ( ( ) ( , ) ))
(1 ) ( ( ) ) ( (1 ) ( ) )
l l
o o
l l L l A L s l E
l L o O L o O
Ge n p U n r EC R AH L P G L L P
p U n r EC R I L P U n R I L P
        
                           (20) 
When individuals are sufficiently risk averse and their initial wealth, n, is small enough, 
( ,0)sGe n and ( ,0)lGe n are both negative which implies that poor individuals will be very 
sensitive to the risks in the agricultural sector when income represents a large proportion of 
their wealth. However, when their initial wealth, n, is relatively large, ( ,0)sGe n and 
( ,0)lGe n will be positive, implying that rich individuals will be more willing to enter the 
agricultural sector.  Define Gesn and 
Ge
ln as threshold levels where ( ,0) 0
Ge
s sGe n  and 
( ,0) 0Gel lGe n  , as shown in Figure 5. Individuals, whose initial wealth is larger than Geln , will 
invest in large farms ( ( )
Ge
l
d
l
n n
L f n

  ); while individuals whose initial wealth is between 
Ge
sn and 
Ge
ln will invest in small farms ( ( )
Ge Ge
l s
d
s
n n n
L f n
 
  ). Remaining individuals will enter 
the other sectors.   
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
 
If there is no uncertainty, i.e. the case of equation (18), the socially optimal labor structure 
is (0,0, )dL N . Therefore, when there are uncertainty and risk aversion, the pure loan scheme 
won’t result in an efficient allocation. It is also not equitable due to ex post differences 
between the lifetime incomes of different types of labor, as shown in equation (18). Finally 
there is no equality of chance. Although all individuals can get loans to cover the costs of 
agriculture, only rich individuals will choose to invest in agriculture because they can afford 
to take the risk. 
3.2 The harvest tax system 
The harvest tax system, as defined here, has two components. Firstly, there is a public loan 
scheme, so that any individual can obtain a loan that has to be fully paid back. In addition to 
making loans available, the government can finance part of the agricultural costs through a 
subsidy. The total subsidy is then repaid by levying a tax on those who make a profit from 
agricultural production. Those who don’t make a profit from agriculture don’t need to pay the 
harvest tax. Unsuccessful farmers, hence, receive a net subsidy, while successful farmers have 
to pay back not only their own loans but also the subsidy received by those who fail. 
For clarity and simplicity, it is assumed that the government gives the same subsidy hS  to s 
and l. In the second period, only the farmers who succeed pay the tax hT . To keep a balanced 
budget, the following relationship should be satisfied as shown in equation (21). 
( ) ( )h hs l s lS L L R T p L p L                                                      (21) 
    Farmers who succeed will have an expense for the harvest tax system, as shown in equation 
(22).  
 
 
 
( ) 1( )
( )
h
h h h hs l
s l
S L L RpT S S S
R p L p L Rp
                                                (22) 
Farmers who fail will achieve a net income hS  for the harvest tax system. Compared with 
the pure loan system, the gap between successful and unsuccessful farmers becomes smaller. 
The variance of farmers’ lifetime incomes however becomes lower, which shows an insurance 
property of the harvest tax system.  
Under the harvest tax system, function ( , )hsGe n S  becomes:    
1( , ) ( ( 1) ( ( )
( , ) )) (1 ) ( ( ) ) ( (1 ) ( ) )
s
s o o
h h
s s L s A
h
L s l E s L o O L o O
Ge n S p U S n r EC R AL L P
Rp
G L L P p U S n r EC R I L P U n R I L P
          
               
       (23) 
and function ( , )hlGe n S  becomes: 
1( , ) ( ( 1) ( ( ) ( , ) ))
(1 ) ( ( ) ) ( (1 ) ( ) )
l l
o o
h h
l l L l A L s l E
h
l L o O L o O
Ge n S p U S n r EC R AH L P G L L P
Rp
p U S n r EC R I L P U n R I L P
            
             
               (24) 
( , )hsGe n S and ( , )
h
lGe n S are both functions of subsidy
hS . When 0hS  , it returns to the 
pure loan system. For any levels of initial wealth, a higher subsidy hS  implies a smaller gap 
(risk) between successful and unsuccessful farmers. An increase in hS  thus shifts ( , 0)sGe n  
and ( , 0)lG n  upwards,  as shown in Figure 6. For a given subsidy
hS , an individual whose 
initial wealth is larger than ,
hGe S
ln will choose to enter the agricultural sector with a large farm; 
an individual whose initial wealth is between ,
hGe S
sn and 
, hGe S
ln  will choose to enter agriculture 
with a small farm; remaining individuals will choose to work in other sectors. However, the 
socially optimal labor structure Ld ( (0,0, )dL N ) cannot be achieved as long 
as , , 0
h hGe S Ge S
l sn n  .   
 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
The harvest tax has two desirable equity implications: it does not imply reverse 
redistribution, and it reduces the differences between the ex post lifetime incomes of 
successful and unsuccessful (i.e. unlucky) farmers. However, there remain differences 
between individuals as far as their willingness to undertake risk is concerned. Individuals with 
a large initial wealth are more likely to enter agriculture than poorer individuals. The harvest 
tax, by providing some degree of insurance, weakens this effect but does not eliminate it. 
Equality of opportunity is still not achieved. 
3.3 The income contingent loans 
Another possible policy option is a system of income contingent loans. An income 
contingent loan is a loan such that: (1) repayment only takes place in the event that an 
individual’s income exceeds a pre-specified level; (2) annual repayments don’t constitute 
more than a certain proportion of an individual’s income; (3) repayment ceases once the loan 
plus interest has been repaid [8]. 
For clarity and simplicity, farmers will borrow IS  in the first period. The successful 
farmers will repay their own loans in the second period. To keep a balanced budget, a lump-
sum tax IT  is levied on all individuals to cover the costs of unsuccessful farmers, as shown in 
equation (25): 
(1 ) (1 )I I Is lp L S p L S R N T                                             (25) 
The difference between the expected utility of farmers with small farms and that of 
individuals in other sectors, ( , )IsGe n S , is shown in equation (26):    
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The difference between the expected utility of farmers with large farms and that of 
individuals in other sectors, ( , )IlGe n S , is shown in equation (27): 
( , ) ( ( ( ) ( , ) ))
(1 ) ( ( ) ) ( (1 ) ( ) )
l l
o o
I I
l l L l A L s l E
I I I
l L o O L o O
Ge n S p U n RT r EC R AH L P G L L P
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                (27) 
The difference between expected lifetime income of s (l) under the income contingent loans 
and under the harvest tax system is: 
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 0
I I I Is l
I o
p L p LRT p S S p S
N
p LS
N
             
 
                        (28) 
This reflects the fact that farmers are subsidized by individuals in other sectors. In the 
income contingent loan system, it is less attractive to enter other sectors compared with the 
harvest system, which will produce a more efficient labor structure. 
The higher expected lifetime incomes of farmers in the income contingent loan system are 
at the expense of individuals in other sectors who become worse off because they have to pay 
the tax, IRT . Successful farmers earn as much as under the pure loan system and more than 
under the harvest tax system. Unsuccessful farmers will earn more than under the pure loan 
system (as they don’t have to repay their loans but only RT) and either more or less than 
under the harvest tax system. They earn less if I I hRT S S   which holds if the subsidy hS  
under the harvest tax system is large enough. 
 
 
Therefore, on the one hand, it is possible with the harvest tax system to outperform a 
contingent loan system, provided that the subsidy is large enough; on the other hand, the 
harvest tax system is more equitable as it avoids the reverse distribution to some extent. 
In summary, the income contingent loan system is similar to the harvest tax system and 
therefore is characterized by most of its advantages over the traditional system. In particular, 
it also provides insurance and results in a more efficient number of farmers. As the maximum 
repayment under the income contingent loan system is limited to the loans of successful 
farmers, some general taxes are still needed to subsidize unsuccessful farmers. In contrast to a 
harvest tax system, it again implies that reverse redistribution occurs. However, it may be 
more practical to implement because successful farmers don’t have to pay more than their 
loans. 
3.4 Some policy options for EU in the future 
According to the European Commission, there are three main directions for the CAP to 
take in the future: (1) keep the current direct payment system unchanged; (2) introduce more 
equity in the distribution of direct payments. Decoupled payments would be composed of a 
basic rate serving as income support and a compulsory additional payment for specific 
“greening” public goods; or (3) phase-out decoupled payments in the current form and 
provide instead limited payments for environmental products. According to the results in this 
paper, three alternative policy options are given in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
Conclusions 
The motivation of this paper is to prove that the tax-subsidy system currently used to 
finance the agricultural sector in the EU is characterized by “reverse redistribution”—rich 
farmers are subsidized by poor farmers and the rest of society. Assuming that government 
intervention is needed due to the difficulty of obtaining private loans to finance the 
agricultural sector, some possible policy options that can avoid reverse redistribution are 
analyzed:  the pure loan system, the harvest tax system and the income contingent loan system. 
The three systems are identical when agricultural output is certain. When there is 
agricultural risk, the systems differ in how the subsidy should be financed. Whereas under a 
pure loan system the farmers repay in full their loans plus interest, a harvest tax system makes 
the repayment of loan costs contingent on whether the farmers make a profit from agricultural 
production. Farmers making losses (or not achieving the minimum income threshold) don’t 
need to repay their loan. Successful farmers, on the other hand, are required to repay their 
loans plus an extra amount to cover the costs of unsuccessful farmers. In the case of the 
income contingent loan, it still requires some general taxation to subsidize the less successful 
farmers and hence has some reverse redistribution effects. 
These loan systems may seem unrealistic given the current CAP and the general 
acceptance of providing farmers with subsidies. The major issues driving CAP reform 
(section 3.4) seem however to be uncontentious A) there should be more equity in the 
distribution of agricultural support; and B) farmers should be paid for environmental 
provisioning. The relevant economic question is therefore the means necessary to achieve 
these ends. One needs to look no further than the education sector to find examples of loan 
systems being used in practice to deal with concerns of efficiency and equity [21-23]. As our 
analysis shows, reverse redistribution is unavoidable given the current tax-subsidy basis of the 
 
 
CAP; so the answer cannot be found in the current thinking. However, if payments are offered 
for environmental products according to demand then a loan system will ensure that sufficient 
farmers enter or stay in the sector—despite an imperfect capital market—to deliver efficient 
quantities of these services, e.g. small or low-income farms can finance themselves and repay 
loans after outcomes.   
Since differences in abilities between individuals are not considered in this paper (only 
differences in initial wealth), an equal distribution of income is also the equitable distribution 
of income because all individuals will have the same productive capacity. What the solution 
might be when considering heterogeneity in individuals’ abilities may be another interesting 
issue. Further the harvest tax system and income contingent loan system presented in this 
paper are based on the actual incomes obtained by the farmers, hence moral hazard—which 
implies that farmers may conceal their real incomes to obtain financial advantage—is a 
relevant issue and a potential subject for future work. Another extension of this paper is to 
analyze the effect of environmental costs on the desirable distribution of subsidies. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. The objectives of CAP from the perspective of Economy, Environment and Society 
(EES) 
Figure 2. The structure of the labor force 
Figure 3. The efficient size of the agricultural work force with small and large farms when 
borrowing is possible 
Note to Figure 3: Although we have three types of labor (s, l and o), the amount of the third 
type of labor, other sectors, is determined by the amounts of the other two types of labor 
because the total population is fixed, i.e. * * *( )o s lL N L L   . 
Figure 4. The efficient subsidy rate 
Figure 5. Initial wealth and the willingness to enter agriculture 
Figure 6. Initial wealth and the willingness to enter agriculture under the harvest tax system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 
Table 1 Costs of different types of labor 
Type of labor Land rental costs Costs of 
producing 
environmental 
products 
Small farm Large farm 
o    
s √  √ 
l  √ √ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Policy options 
Option No. Name Description 
1 Reference Current policy (2010) Decoupled payments 
2 I Payment based on farmer’s 
income and a subsidy for 
environmental products 
The subsidy should 
primarily be distributed to 
poor farmers. 
 II Dynamic hybrid model (Ref and 
I) 
The combination of 
reference and I which 
implies slower reform. 
3 III A pure loan plus a subsidy for 
environmental products 
Farmers can take up a loan 
and repay it after they 
harvest. Any individual has 
the opportunity to enter 
agriculture. 
 IV An income contingent loan 
system plus a subsidy for 
environmental products 
A system of income 
contingent loans makes 
repayments conditional on 
whether the income of the 
farmer exceeds a pre-
specified level and 
computes repayments as a 
percentage of their 
 
 
earnings. The maximum 
amount to be paid is the 
loan plus interests. 
 VI A harvest tax plus a subsidy for 
environmental products 
A harvest tax system makes 
repayments contingent on 
income. Repayments from 
successful farmers exceed 
the cost of their loans. The 
difference between 
repayments and cost is used 
to subsidize unsuccessful 
farmers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supporting Information Legends 
Appendix S1. Main variables and functions used in the paper 
